Author’s Note: This article contains my concluding thoughts (so far) on the impact of the ASP and CAS on WWII. I am, I think rightly so, biased in favor of tactical air power over strategic air power, and I consider CAS the pinnacle of tactical air power. That bias shows in this article, but I argue there is enough evidence to show the massive, yet unrecognized, impact of the 9th Air Force on the war.
While research is still underway on the origins of the Tactical Air Control Party, I can firmly say that TACP originated in the WWII Air Support Parties, which had their origin in North Africa in 1942.[1] The ASP/ASPO model, heavily influenced by the British model for ground-based forward air control, was born in the 1942/43 Mediterranean Theatre. It was forged during the North African struggles, found a new and improved identity in the Rover Joe system in the Sicily and Italy campaigns of 1943, and reached maturity under 9th Air Force in the Western European Theatre.
The Air Support Party functioned surprisingly similar to how the ROMAD/ALO system worked in the 275X era from the late 70s to early 90s. The ASPs consisted of radio operators, vehicle/radio maintainers, and Jeep drivers, all to assist a close air support-expert pilot in his duties coordinating and controlling close air support for the aligned ground commander. The big difference between the WWII ASPs and the 275X TACPs was the lack of proliferation below the division level. The division was typically the lowest level the ASPs were allocated, and they operated with subordinate units as necessary. In Western Europe, these ASPs would typically support their aligned divisions at the front lines, especially in armored units where supported commanders could leverage Armored Column Cover (ACC) tactics.[2]
It is important to recognize the overall impact of close air support and the ASPs on the broader war, especially in retrospect when the 8th Air Force receives so much more recognition and praise for its strategic effort. Despite 8th Air Force’s recognition in USAF circles, one of the best historians of the previous generation, John Keegan, once wrote, “Because the peak of the bombers’ success coincided with the defeat of the Wehrmacht on the field and the progressive occupation of Reich territory by the Allied armies, the claims of strategic-bombing advocates that they possessed the secret of victory have not and can never be proved.”[3] In other words, 8th Air Force proved nothing in terms of strategic bombing’s impact on WWII, even though the USAF touts 8th Air Force as the deciding factor while they bastardize 9th Air Force because their function was to support the ground effort.
I argue that destroying the German military and Allied territorial gains were the most important factors in winning the Western Front. How did the Allies, mainly comprised of US forces, so effectively destroy the vaunted Wehrmacht in less than a year? They did it by blasting armored divisions through front lines, enveloping German lines, and relentlessly pursuing retreating Germans. US forces were enabled to operate this way because of the immense 9th Air Force close air support provided to the front lines. Most often, the front lines moved too fast for artillery support, but it didn’t matter because they had CAS instead. If you take away the close air support effort, then you don’t have Allied forces going from Normandy to the Siegfried Line in less than 6 months as they did in 1944.
Obviously, close air support was only possible with a fair degree of air superiority (sometimes only local air superiority), and 8th Air Force can take credit for drawing the Luftwaffe away from the front lines to defend German cities from the Strategic Bombing Campaign. Additionally, it is essential to remember that 9th Air Force’s responsibility was the whole of tactical airpower, not just CAS. The three tactical missions of the time were air superiority, interdiction, and close air support, in that order of priority. You don’t have CAS without air superiority; therefore, in the Army Air Force’s mind, air superiority was the most important mission. The flaw in that thinking is that there is no point in air superiority if you don’t leverage it to attack opposing militaries from the air with your airplanes.
Air superiority is not an end in itself; it is a battlefield condition that allows an air force to perform other functions. From that point of view, WWII ground commanders may have been right in saying that close air support wasn’t the last priority of tactical airpower - it was the pinnacle. The goal of the first two missions (superiority and interdiction) was to force a disadvantaged enemy into an unfavorable position. They were forced to disperse/retreat without air cover, or they were forced to mass to confront an Allied force ready to blow through them with CAS-supported armor units. That conundrum forced upon the enemy is the pinnacle of tactical airpower discovered in WWII. Close air support, enabled by the other two missions, forced the enemy to choose between two bad decisions.
In developing the tactical airpower system that became 9th Air Force, the Allies had inadvertently created a well-rounded system equating to an improved version of the German Blitzkrieg. The early-war German blitz had focused on dive bombers and mechanized units who blew through unprepared, ill-equipped, fixed-position defenders. The Germans of 1939-40 had the luxury of free air superiority, allowing them to use heavily loaded dive bombers. The Allies didn’t have the luxury of fixed defenders or the use of dive bombers and were lucky the P-47 Thunderbolt was naturally well-suited for close air support. The Allies were forced to fight an enemy that was highly capable of fighting aircraft from the ground or the air and who was a dynamic, mobile ground force with better tanks. The 9th Air Force overcame those factors by using a well-rounded view of tactical air power and leveraging the air superiority advantage granted by a well-manned and constant strategic bombing effort to distract the Luftwaffe.
Most important to defeating a dynamic enemy with CAS were the Air Support Parties at the front line to plan, coordinate, and execute close air support. They executed CAS so effectively that one German general even demanded to surrender to Pete Quesada, the IX TAC commander, instead of the ground commander who captured him. He refused to surrender to the ground commander because he was defeated mainly by CAS, not ground troops. The ASPs were central to ground success throughout the war, and it’s a shame that there’s not more written about them yet (but I am working on it). The ASPs were so effective that they were written into official doctrine a year after the war ended. In the 1946 edition of Field Manual 31-35, the Air Support Party was reintroduced as the Tactical Air Control Party.
Author’s Note: This concludes the WWII Series for now. It will be revisited in the future after the final research is solidified. TACP in the Korean War will be the next series.
[1] Yes, I am arguing that TACP’s origin is in 1942.
[2] See WWII TACP Origins #s 3-4.
[3] John Keegan. The Second World War. (New York, NY: Penguin Books, 1990), 432.