Mediterranean Campaign and Rover Joes
Failed Umbrella Concept
In November 1942, American Army Ground Forces (AGF) committed their first troops to combat in WWII to the Operation Torch landings in French North Africa (Morrocco and Algeria). The 12th Air Force acted as the primary Army Air Forces (AAF) counterpart to the combined British/American ground campaign and served in a primarily tactical capacity to secure air superiority and provide interdiction and close air support to Eisenhower’s ground forces. The Allies faced little resistance during their initial landings, yet the existing TACS system faced early scrutiny and challenges.
The main issue was the “air umbrella” system for close air support advocated by Gen. George Patton and Field Marshall Bernard Montgomery. Like many ground commanders, they argued that their corps and divisions should be assigned fighter and light bomber squadrons to provide 24/7 air cover for their aligned units. Typical of Army leaders, they felt that every weapon in their battle space should be controlled by themselves. The major downside to the umbrella concept was that it restricted the massing of tactical aircraft when their supported unit was not actively engaged. In other words, it forced an already undersized tactical air force to limit its flexibility across the theatre. Most ground commanders were too narrowly focused on their own battle space to realize the need for centralized control and flexible, decentralized execution.[1]
The opposing view, held by British Air Marshal Arthur Tedder and later General Quesada, held that all air power should be centrally controlled by a theatre air commander. The air commander would allocate tactical aircraft where they were most needed on the battlefield, per request from supported units. Although FM 31-35 failed to clarify whether aircraft were to be centrally controlled or dispersed to align with specific ground units, it did provide the command and control framework for centralized control with Air Support Parties (ASPs, the predecessor to TACP) collocated with ground units to provide decentralized execution.[2]
Kasserine Pass
American forces fought most of the Northwest Africa Campaign under the umbrella system, which promptly fell flat on its face, just like the British air commanders said it would. In February 1943, Rommel attacked the American front at Kasserine Pass, and the American TACS, under the air umbrella system, failed to provide adequate volumes of close air support to the AGF defenders. Although the Germans battered the AGF, they nonetheless failed to achieve their operational objective of securing the pass, largely thanks to the still-centrally controlled interdiction effort. The air umbrella experiment was promptly ended after the battle, cemented in doctrine in the July 1943 publication of Field Manual 100-20 Command and Employment of Air Power, which declared air, ground, and maritime commanders co-equal and in total control of their own assets.
Although the Americans received their first gut punch at Kasserine Pass, the battle proved useful in a few ways. First, the American TACS and air power doctrine changed for the better with the air commanders’ newfound independence. Second, the air umbrella concept was abandoned for a much more effective C2 system of centralized command and decentralized execution revolving around the Air Support Parties. Third, those very ASPs gained experience in close air support tactics, techniques, and procedures that blossomed into the Rover system in Sicily and Italy.
Rover Joe
American and British Air Support Parties were the lynchpins for any hints of close air support success in Tunisia, but after kicking Rommel off the African continent, they realized some gaps in the system that limited their effectiveness. The first realization was that the ASPs and their Air Support Officers (also known as Air Support Party Officers - ASPOs) could not stay in a division or corps command post and only coordinate on-call and preplanned close air support. There were too many variables that affected the pilot's ability to provide effective support on-scene, and they often struck the wrong targets when plans went haywire, disallowing friendly forces from employing their preplanned marking mechanism.[3]
Accordingly, the Air Support Party Officers decided that they needed to get themselves to the front line with a radio to control every (possible) CAS mission for their supported ground unit. Together with their British counterparts, the American ASPOs came up with the first system of ground-based forward air control, dubbed the Rover system. The basic concept included embedding the Air Support Party with the front-line echelons of their supported division and acquiring a sufficient observation post on a military crest overseeing the battle space. At the OP, they typically dug out a foxhole for cover and concealment while the enlisted ASP members set up the radio jeep on the opposite side of the hill, out of view of the battlefield. They often used a long telephone wire to remote the radio handset to the vehicle-borne radio suite for HF, VHF, and UHF communications nets so that the officers could communicate constantly with the front-line units and their supporting aircraft. The officers used their enlisted Air Support Party members as radio operators, jeep drivers, and maintainers for both the vehicles and radios (the first ROMADs).[4]
Figure 1: An ASP member operates a radio and map station near an OP
Figure 2: A typical Rover OP foxhole setup. Note the routed hand mic - the radios were likely routed from a jeep on the opposite side of the hill.
Sicily and Italy Campaigns
In Sicily and Italy, the British and Americans developed their communications nets and TTPs in slightly different ways, resulting in different names and callsigns for their Rovers. The American ground FACs became “Rover Joes” while the British and eventually the Australians used “Rover David” and “Rover Paddy.” As AGF and AAF saw the Mediterranean Campaign as a dress rehearsal for an eventual invasion of Western France, they prioritized the refinement of the CAS system for use in the “real” war in Western Europe. Rovers were so effective at coordinating and controlling close air support in the Sicilian Campaign that the Army hardly fought upon landing, taking negligible losses on their way to the Italian mainland.
Another significant change to the CAS system came in the form of an effective CAS aircraft. Given the futility of medium and light bomber CAS, 12th Air Force began experimenting with fighter aircraft for close air support. Some P-51 Mustangs, initially designed with ground attack in mind, were converted to A-36s by adding dive brakes for accurate munitions delivery. The experiment didn’t make it through the Mediterranean Campaign thanks to the Mustang’s liquid-cooled engine, which made it terribly vulnerable to ground fire.[5] With the addition of dive brakes on the A-36 version, the platform proved far too vulnerable for use in CAS.
On the other hand, 12th Air Force found success in another platform, one that was designed solely for air-to-air combat and bomber escort. The P-47 Thunderbolt (the A-10s namesake) proved to be the most valuable CAS platform in the Mediterranean Campaign thanks to its accuracy at low altitude and slow speed. Its eight wing-mounted .50 caliber machine guns could wreak havoc on any ground vehicle, and it could swap out machine guns for up to 2,500 pounds of wing-mounted bombs. Additionally, its large, air-cooled engine proved to be highly survivable against small arms and smaller AAA rounds. The Germans quickly adopted the name Achtung Jabo for the P-47, roughly translating to “most terrible weapon.” Later in the war, downed P-47 pilots were immediately hung upon capture, unlike their B-17 or P-51 counterparts, who were afforded POW status, thanks to the fear the Thunderbolt pilots instilled in SS and conventional German troops.
As the P-47 quickly superseded the P-51, P-40, P-38, and bombers in the CAS role, their pilots also took over the primary role as Rovers and Air Support Party Officers, bringing their CAS expertise to AGF planning cells and controlling on the front lines. Other aircraft still performed the CAS role, but Thunderbolt pilots became the experts, bringing that expertise to the ground side for eight to twelve-week rotations. The enlisted members of the Air Support Party (the early ROMADs) remained with their aligned unit throughout the war to maintain continuity and grew to become extremely competent in CAS procedures, often taking the bulk of coordination responsibility. The enlisted ASP members also most frequently provided on-scene coordination with ground units and submitted on-call CAS requests so their Air Support Officers could focus on FAC duties. The Rover system, and more broadly, the CAS system, was so effectively refined in Sicily and Italy after initial failure in Northwest Africa that it went mostly unchanged going into June 1944. It became even more effective in Western Europe thanks to the Quesada/Bradley and Weyland/Patton air-ground partnerships.
More Rover Photos
Figure 3: An enlisted ASP member transmits from the radio jeep. Given the notebook, he is likely transmitting a request for on-call CAS.
Figure 4: Two Rover Joes overlook their aligned GFCs battle space from their OP
Figure 5: One Rover Joe enjoys a pipe while his buddy does map work and handles the radio simultaneously
Figure 6: Rover Joes showcasing their capabilities for senior AAF and AGF officers in Sicily
[1] Christopher M. Rein. The North African Air Campaign: U.S. Army Air Forces from El Alamein to Salerno.
(Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2011), 119-121.
[2] Benjamin Franklin Cooling. Special Studies: Case studies in the Development of Close Air Support, 172-174.
[3] Army Air Forces Historical Office. Army Air Forces Historical Studies Number 30: Ninth Air Force in the Western
Desert Campaign. February 1945. Call # 101-30 in the USAF Collection, DAFHRA, Maxwell AFB, AL. 73-82.
[4] AAF Evaluation Board in the European Theatre of Operations. Tactics and Techniques Developed by the United
States Tactical Air Commands in the European Theatre of Operations. October 29, 1945. 28-30.
[5] Liquid-cooled engines are more vulnerable to ground fire because one shot by small arms fire can cause a catastrophic overheating, forcing the pilot to immediately land or bail out.
