Rover Joe WWII TACP Origin Justification

Rover Joe WWII TACP Origin Justification

     Abstract: This article zooms in on the WWII Rover Joes (Air Support Party), WWII reports on the development of Rover Joe TTPs, and shows that the Rover Joes/Air Support Party is the origin of TACP, which are renamed TACP in the 1946 FM 31-35. See pictures at the end of the article for exact excerpts of quoted material. The photo gallery at the end of this article is the most extensive yet.

 

 

 

     I trace the origins of TACP to the 1942 publication of FM 31-35 Aviation in Support of Ground Units and its definition of the Air Support Party. Arguably, the beginning of TACP was in April 1977, when the 275X0 career field was created, but I argue the beginning is in the practically applied concept of TACP in the WWII Air Support Party/Rover Joe. The creation of the career field was just permanently providing career specialists to a TACP concept that was first named so in 1946 but first conceived in the budding CAS system of the WWII Mediterranean Campaign.

     Below, I compare the 1942 definition of the Air Support Party to the postwar (1946 FM 31-35) definition of the Tactical Air Control Party. While the definitions clearly aren’t direct translations, the WWII experience with the Rover Joes evolved the Air Support Party role from its 1942 definition to the 1946 definition of TACP.

1942 FM 31-35 Aviation in Support of Ground Forces: Air Support Party – A highly mobile group composed of one or more air support party officers and necessary personnel and equipment to transmit air support requests to air support control, and to operate communications with aircraft-in-flight net.[1]

1946 FM 31-35 Air Ground Operations: Tactical Air Control Party - A subordinate operational component of the tactical air control group designed for the control of aircraft from forward observation posts. The tactical air control party operates at division, regimental, or battalion level, as required by the situation.[2]

     The definition of the ASP changed to TACP based on the success of the Rover Joe during the war. The following excerpts are directly taken from a WWII report on the Air Support Party’s mid-war evolution as it pertained to their frontline role as Rover Joes. As you read the below, take note of the similarities between these WWII-era ASPs and what we know of as TACPs (see full reference screenshots at the bottom of the article).

     Introduction. “Rover Joe” is the name applied to an extremely rapid and efficient system of obtaining air support on vital targets. By this system fighter bombers are controlled and directed to vital targets by the voice of a forward controller [an air support party officer] who can see the target from his observation post, and who coaches the pilot directly over two-way VHF radio set.

     History. The principles of “Rover Joe” were first used by a Group Captain of the RAF during the great offensive in the Desert in 1942. In an attempts to increase the efficiency of air support tactics, he conceived the idea of assigning targets to his pilots from an advanced post whose location enabled him to have immediate, first-hand information of the battle. Using radio installations in an armored car which was situated to provide a clear view of the front lines, he directed operations on enemy targets with great success.

     During the battle of El Hamma on 24 March 1942, when every possible means of target identification was employed, our forces made use of controllers operating both from aircraft and from a radio-equipped tank. The land-based “Rover Joe” system was first used experimentally by the XII Air Support Command in the Salerno landings. Subsequently it was employed in the Liri Valley and on the Anzio beachhead, where well-informed ground officers, equipped with two-way radio, directed close air support from advantageous forward positions. So successful were the results achieved by “Rover Joe” in this sector that it was decided to continue its operation and standardize its employment….

     Operation. The officers of the “Rover Joe” party station themselves in a well concealed observation post, preferably on a hilltop, from which they have a commanding view of the front lines. The equipment is kept behind a hillside, out of view of enemy observation and protected from enemy fire. Telephone lines extend from the radio equipment to the observation post. Officers in the observation post are supplied with all necessary maps and photos of the terrain they are covering.

     When the situation indicates a likely profitable employment of the system, the Tactical Air Command assigns a given number of aircraft to “Rover Joe”. Normally, the aircraft arrive in flights of four every thirty minutes to attack radio designated targets…

     As the advancing ground units in the critical area encounter targets which are delaying the advance, the battalion or regimental headquarters radio “Rover Joe” over the S.C.R. – 193 sets for air support. Requests are studied by ground officers in the “Rover Joe” party and are given a definite priority rating in accordance with the local plan of battle. The requests are then handed over to the air officer who assesses the target’s suitability for air attack and accepts of rejects it on that basis.

     When a target is accepted, “Rover Joe” waits until the flight of fighter bombers, usually four in number, reports in and begins to circle overhead, out of range of enemy ground fire. Then, by two-way radio, he describes the target to the flight leader. Targets are first located by reference to 1,000 yard grids. After the pilot becomes oriented and determines the area referred to, the controller makes a detailed verbal description of the target, its type and exact location in reference to conspicuous landmarks in the vicinity. To eliminate any error in sighting the correct target, the leader of the flight frequently makes a dry run on his objective while the controller watches. On other occasions the target is marked by smoke shells fired in a definite pattern…

     Upon leaving the target area, the flight leader gives “Rover Joe” his own impression of the effects of the bombing. This information is immediately relayed forward to the supported ground unit for its guidance.[3]

     Pay special attention to the last two paragraphs of the excerpt, which include familiar descriptions of a WWII-era CAS flow. Elements include a rudimentary check-in, a CAS brief including a gridded target location, a correlation of various methods, and a BDA. The US Army and the Army Air Forces carried this methodology through the rest of the Italian Campaign and into Western Europe after D-Day. Its success was reflected in a complied stack of letters and memos lauding the success of the Rover Joe system. The following letter from General Patton to XIX TAC commander Otto P. Weyland exemplifies this success, “The superior efficiency and cooperation afforded to this Army by the forces under your command is the best example of the combined use of air and ground troops I have ever witnessed. Due to tireless efforts of your flyers, large numbers of hostile vehicles and troop concentrations ahead of our advancing columns have been harassed or obliterated. The information passed directly to the head of our columns from the air [pilot to Rover Joe] has saved time and lives…”[4]

     Remember when reading the previous quote, that George Patton previously despised the CAS system used in North Africa. This letter from Patton to Weyland, written only 12 days after Patton’s formation of 3rd Army in Western France, portrays a profound change in attitude toward CAS. That attitude change was primarily thanks to the XIX Tactical Air Command’s utilization of Rover Joes at the front lines.

     The commendation for Rover Joe-supplied close air support continued in the aftermath of the Battle of the Bulge. Acting commanding officer of the 101st Airborne, General McAuliffe, wrote to 9th Air Force chief, General Vandenberg, “I wish to express to you and the personnel of your command who supported us at Bastogne, the admiration of the 101st Airborne Infantry Division for the tremendous support we received from the fighter-bombers of the Ninth Air Force. Despite intense flak, these fighter pilots repeatedly attacked and disrupted formations preparing to act against the town. Attacks were made on targets within 400 yards of our infantry lines. They were a tremendous boost to our morale and were a vital contribution to the successful defense of Bastogne.”[5] It is notable that General McAuliffe mentions targets within 400 yards because, at the time, targets within 1,000 yards were banned from CAS aircraft.

     There was only one issue with the Rover Joe system, as seen by reviewing officers. It was a deviation from the official doctrine outlined in FM 31-35, but like many aspects of the war, the doctrine was written before US troops fought in the war. Thanks to the effectiveness of the system, it was decided to write the Rover Joe/Air Support Party system into official doctrine and rename it Tactical Air Control Party.[6] It is uncertain who exactly decided the name was to become TACP, but there are hints. Under Pete Quesada, the originator of some of the best CAS tactics used by the Allies in WWII, his XIX TAC had renamed the Air Support Party to Tactical Air Support Party (TASP), and Air Support Party Officers were renamed Tactical Air Liaison Officers (TALO). This change occurred shortly before D-Day and stuck throughout the rest of 1944 and 1945. It is likely that someone from Quesada’s staff, possibly Quesada himself, was responsible for the switch from Air Support Party to Tactical Air Control Party in 1946.

     Regardless of who changed the name to TACP, the first use of the term in 1946 was a direct reflection of the ASP/Rover Joe entity used by the Tactical Air Commands throughout WWII. Therefore, we TACPs can clearly trace our origin to the Rover Joes of the WWII era, beginning in 1942.

Rover Joe Report

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

CAS/Rover Joe Photo Gallery

 

 

 

 

Rover Joe Control Example Transcript

 

 

 

 

 

 


 NATHAN BACHAND, PH.D


[1] Department of the Army, FM 31-35: Aviation in Support of Ground Forces. 1942. 2.

[2] Department of the Army, FM 31-35: Air-Ground Operations. 1946. Call # 170.121031-35 in the

USAF Collection, DAFHRA, Maxwell AFB, AL. 7.

[3] Department of the Army, WWII Report on Close Air Support with Rover Joe Indexes. January 1944 – January 1945. Call # 632.310 in the USAF Collection, DAFHRA, Maxwell AFB, AL. 13-15

[4] Ibid., appendix, letter from Gen. Patton to Gen. Weyland 12 August 1944.

[5] Ibid., Letter Gen. McAuliffe to Gen. Vandenberg, 25 January 1945.

[6] Ibid., 5.

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